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We experimentally test the effect of enforceable non-compete clauses on
working effort and spin-off entrepreneurship. An employee invests effort in
the probability of a profitable innovation. After a successful innovation the
employee may want to start her own spin-off firm and compete with her
prior employer. In the baseline setup without non-compete clause, spin-offs
result from failed negotiation about employee compensation even though they
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reduce the joint payoffs of both parties. In two treatments with non-compete
clause the employer can prevent successful innovators from leaving the firm.
We find no significantly negative effect of non-compete clauses on employee
effort, even if compensation is low.
Keywords: non-compete clause, effort, spin-off entrepreneurship, reciprocity,
fairness
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1. Introduction
Policy makers around the globe have attempted to emulate the success of Silicon Valley,
the undisputed center of the global high-tech industry. Myriads of regional cluster
initiatives are named alluding to Silicon Valley - examples range from New York City’s
Silicon Alley or London’s Silicon Roundabout to Polymer Valley (Northeastern Ohio) or
Telecom Valley (Sophia Antipolis, France). Efforts to set up new high-tech clusters often
involve attempts to recreate Silicon Valley’s legendary entrepreneurial culture. As many
students of Silicon Valley have observed, the region is characterized by an extraordinarily
fluid labor market, which not only features high levels of labor mobility across existing
firms, but also exceptionally high rates of new firm formation. To spurn a similar extent
of entrepreneurial dynamism, incubator and accelerator facilities for startup firms are
set up, networking activities are supported, and access to venture capital is facilitated at
many locations, often based on public policy efforts and substantial amounts of taxpayer
money.
A crucial element of Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurial history are new firms started
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by individuals who previously worked at incumbent firms in the same or closely re-
lated industries. This type of ”spin-off entrepreneurship” (also known as ”spin-out
entrepreneurship”) was decisive for the formation and ascent of the Silicon Valley semi-
conductor industry, one of the Valley’s signature industries. Spin-off entrepreneurship
led to the formation of Fairchild Semiconductors, which in turn spawned the prover-
bial ”Fairchildren” - a large number of spin-offs including industry leaders such as Intel
and AMD. Spin-offs are similarly prominent in other Silicon Valley industries such as
computer disk drives (Christensen, 1993; Agarwal et al., 2004). Silicon Valley’s spin-off
juggernaut has not gone unnoticed, and it has been suggested that spin-offs are key
to understanding the outstanding role the region plays in the contemporary high-tech
industry (Klepper, 2010).
A recent strand of literature suggests that Silicon Valley’s spin-off dynamics, as well as
more generally its fluid labor market, may not just be a ”cultural” specificity, but may
have developed in response to the unusual institutional setup of the Californian labor
market. More specifically, Silicon Valley offers an exceptionally good environment for
aspiring spin-off entrepreneurs, as Californian employers cannot prevent their employees
from moving to competitors or to start their own firms in the same industry (Gilson,
1999). As opposed to most U.S. states or other industrialized countries, contractual
provisions to this end - known as covenants not to compete or non-compete clauses
(NCCs) for short - are not enforced in the state of California.
Non-compete clauses have been found to reduce labor mobility (Gilson, 1999) and
to contribute to regional brain drain, as affected employees may be induced to relo-
cate to jurisdictions where these clauses are not enforced (Marx et al., 2015). These
findings suggest that policy makers may foster entrepreneurial activities by outlawing
non-compete clauses or at least exempting entrepreneurial ventures from their enforce-
ment. But would that be good policy? This question is difficult to answer in the light
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of field data. On the one hand, non-compete clauses may have desirable effects. A
particularly relevant concern in this context is giving employers an incentive to invest
in their employees’ (non-firm specific) human capital (Garmaise, 2011). On the other
hand, besides their chilling effects on labor mobility there may be further cost attached
to enforceable NCCs.
Theoretical work (Kraekel and Sliwka, 2009) shows that non-compete clauses may
have an adverse effect on employee effort. NCCs deprive an employee of the option to
open her own business, or to offer her knowledge and talent to a new employer. This
diminishes the scope for renegotiating her wage once her innovation efforts have led
to success, which in turn reduces her incentive to exert innovation effort in the first
place - or so the theoretical argument goes. The reduction in effort may be particularly
pronounced if employees anticipate that their employer may not value their ideas as
highly as they do themselves. In this situation, which has frequently been observed in
the context of spin-off entrepreneurship (Klepper and Thompson, 2010), restrictions to
employee mobility may be particularly problematic from a welfare perspective.
Effects of non-compete clauses on employee effort have largely been neglected in the
empirical literature. Effort is not directly observable and thus difficult to study using
field data. This suggests to close the gap by way of a laboratory experiment. In this
paper, we translate the relationship between employer and employee into a simple se-
quential principal-agent game and compare behavior in a baseline design without NCC
to two treatments with a NCC. In the experiment, the more effort the agent exerts the
more likely a profitable innovation. If the innovation is successful, the agent may leave
the firm to become a competitor; this is how we experimentally implement spin-off en-
trepreneurship. Instead, the agent may make a take-it-or-leave-it demand for a bonus
that makes her willing to stay.
We use three variants of this basic setup differing only in the outside option of the bar-
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gaining stage. In the Baseline setup, if the employee leaves both players compete in the
marketplace and each makes a small profit. In this case, joint profits are substantially
lower than if the employee had stayed. This is due to competition, which in the exper-
iment favors only the customers. In the two treatments with NCC, the agent receives
a commonly known and predefined compensation and is prevented from competing in
the market. In the High treatment, if renegotiations fail, her compensation is the same
as the renegotiation outcome in the Baseline (under standard economics assumptions of
commonly known opportunistic rationality). In the Low treatment, her compensation
is considerably below this benchmark. By making sure that the two treatments and the
Baseline only differ in one respect, namely the outside option at the renegotiation stage,
we may directly compare behavior between these different settings.
In the setting of our experiment, self-interested rational agents would exert lower
effort (relative to the Baseline) if an NCC with a Low level of compensation is imposed.
Contrary to this theoretical prediction, we find no significant effect of the NCC on effort,
irrespective of the level of compensation. We observe strong reciprocal patterns not only
in wages and effort, but also in how renegotiation demands depend on received wages
and invested effort.
From the perspective of the two players, enforcing non-compete clauses is efficiency
enhancing because the spin-off event, and thus market competition, is prevented. In
the experiment, if mandated compensation is low, employers win from the NCC and
employees do not lose. If mandated compensation is high, employees win and employers
do not lose.
In dealing with non-compete clauses, policy makers pondering a legal reform do not
operate in a legal vacuum, but have to consider introducing or abolishing it. To see
how a reform of NCCs affects experienced actors, we expose participants to a regime
change. For the two supply-side parties, abolishing the enforcement of non-compete
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clauses clearly has adverse effects. Whether compensation is high or low, joint profit is
reduced. Yet effort increases if the clause is no longer enforced and if compensation was
low before. Newly introducing non-compete clauses has less pronounced effects. There
is only a small positive effect on joint profit if compensation is high.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of
related literature. Section 3 introduces the design of the experimental game. In Section
4 we formulate hypotheses under alternative behavioral assumptions. We present the
experimental setup in Section 5 and analyze the experimental data in Section 6. Section
7 concludes with a discussion of our main results and their relevance.
2. Non-Compete Clauses: Legal Provisions and Prior Literature
Legal orders in various jurisdictions treat non-compete clauses in very different ways
(Ingram, 2002). In the U.S., some states simply prohibit them, such as California (Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code 16600), North Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code 9-08-06), and historically
Michigan, where the respective provision (Mich. Comp. Laws 445.761) was repealed
in 1985 as part of a broader antitrust reform (Marx et al., 2009). Most jurisdictions,
however, apply a rule of reason and investigate how onerous the constraint is for the
agent, and how legitimate the reasons are for the principal (for detail, see Ingram,
2002). Frequently, the ban on competition is limited in time, e.g. for two years, and
in space, e.g. to the state where the firm is established. Similar to the U.S., the laws
on non-compete clauses (NCCs) differ across European countries. Such covenants are
illegal under European Community legislation if their duration exceeds five years, or if
the contracting partner promises not to manufacture, purchase or sell goods or services
after the termination of the contract (Art. 5 (1) Commission Regulation No. 330/2010,
OJ L 102/1). Another example is a characteristic set of rules for non-compete clauses in
German law, which inspired the setup of our model. In Germany, non-compete clauses
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are limited to a maximum of 2 years (§74 a I 3 HGB) and they are valid only if the
principal pays at least half of the yearly salary (§74 II HGB).
Non-compete clauses are widespread in jurisdictions where they are legal, and nearly
ubiquitous in high-technology industries (Stuart and Sorenson, 2003). The literature has
mainly been interested in their effect on labor mobility. Gilson (1999) first suggested
that the non-enforceability of non-compete clauses enhanced labor mobility in California,
which in turn may have contributed to Silicon Valley’s emergence as the world’s leading
high-technology cluster. This conjecture has motivated subsequent studies exploring the
potential trade-off between employers’ incentives to invest in employees’ human capital
formation and positive externalities emanating from the mobility of highly skilled work-
ers and its repercussions on industrial dynamics (Fallick et al., 2006; Franco and Mitchell,
2008). Empirical research based on field data provides substantial (albeit indirect) evi-
dence indicating that non-compete clauses are effective constraints to employee mobility.
Marx et al. (2009) use patent data to study how the legal change in Michigan affected
the likelihood of inventors switching employers within the state. Relative to other U.S.
states where non-compete clauses remained illegal, Michigan experienced a significantly
lower increase in intra-state inventor mobility after the reform of 1985. This finding
is corroborated by geographic patterns of citations to U.S. university patents (Belen-
zon and Schankerman, 2013). While U.S. state borders generally constrain knowledge
flows (as measured by patent citations), the effect is significantly weaker for post-reform
Michigan, suggesting a decrease in intra-state knowledge flows due to restricted employee
mobility. Marx et al. (2015) furthermore show that post-reform Michigan suffered from
an exodus of inventors to states without enforceable non-compete clauses.
Garmaise (2011) studies effects of non-compete clauses on top-level executives of pub-
licly traded U.S. firms. He shows that increased enforceability of non-compete clauses
is associated with decreased rates of mobility and with lower, more salary based com-
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pensation. This is interpreted as supporting a model in which both employers and
employees can invest in non-contractible human capital, and where the enforceability
of non-compete clauses shifts incentives to invest into human capital from employees to
employers. Further results by Stuart and Sorenson (2003) for the U.S. biotechnology in-
dustry indicate that non-compete clauses also reduce rates of spin-off entrepreneurship.
Samila and Sorenson (2011) likewise find that the regional availability of venture capital
is more strongly associated with patent counts, new firm formation and employment
growth in U.S. states where non-compete clauses are not enforceable. They attribute
these results to spin-off entrepreneurship as well as positive effects of employee mobility
on knowledge spillovers and the quality of employee-employer matching.
The substantial prior work on non-compete clauses notwithstanding, only a very small
literature has explored the core issue of the present paper: the effect of NCCs on employee
effort. In the model by Kraekel and Sliwka (2009), if an innovation occurs, an employer
is always better off ex post with a non-compete clause. However, ex-ante incentives
for the worker to exert effort are higher without a clause due to the prospect of a high
retention offer in case of a successful innovation. Thus, whether or not the employer
would like to impose a non-compete clause depends on the relative importance of effort.
The empirical study of Marx et al. (2009) finds no evidence suggesting that the Michigan
reform decreased overall patenting rates (which could be seen as a proxy of employee
effort) of the state’s inventors, but more direct individual-level results are lacking.
3. Model
In this section, we outline a simple principal-agent game, from which we will subse-
quently derive hypotheses about players’ behavior. Suitably parameterized, the model
also provides the foundation of our experiment. In the Baseline setup, a principal P and
an agent A are exogenously matched and interact once. As is typical in principal-agent
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relationships, the initiative is taken by P who unilaterally chooses wage w ∈ [0,W ].
Knowing w, agent A chooses effort e ∈ [1,E], which remains private information. Na-
ture decides whether a project is successful with probability p =
√
e/ρ, with ρ >
√
E.
If the project is not successful, the game ends and payoffs are VP = pi − w for P and
VA = w − e for A, respectively. If the project is successful, A can ask for a retention
offer v ∈ [0,Π], with Π > pi. P may only accept or reject. If P accepts, payoffs are
VP = Π−w−v for P and VA = w+v− e for A. If P rejects, payoffs equal VP = αΠ−w
and VA = αΠ + w − e, with α < 1/2. In the Treatments, if P rejects, payoffs equal
VP = Π− w − k and VA = w + k − e.
1. P pays 
w to A
2. Knowing 
w, A invests 
e into project
3. with 
probability
innovation 
occurs
p=√e/ρ
1-p
p
(π−ww−e)
a) Retention 
bargaining:
A demands v
b) P accepts 
or rejects
(Π−w−vv+w−e )
outcome 
depending on 
treatment
accept
reject
Figure 1: Timeline of the Principal-Agent Interaction
Note: Wage: w ∈ [0,W ] with W > 0; effort: e ∈ [1, E] with E > 1; probability of success: p = √e/ρ,
with ρ >
√
E; random success: Π with probability p and pi (with Π > pi > 0) with probability 1 − p;
retention offer v ∈ [0,Π].
The model fits any activity that requires unobservable effort from an agent for reducing
the uncertainty about the success of some activity that is profitable for the principal. One
such activity is innovation, another one would be a potential extension of the customer
base. If the project fails, the principal’s payoff pi is small. If the project is successful,
the principal’s payoff depends on the agent’s choice. If the agent stays in the firm, the
principal reaps monopoly profit Π. If, however, the agent leaves the firm and exploits
the success for herself, both only earn αΠ. By α < 1/2, this competitive profit is strictly
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below half the monopoly profit Π.1 Consequently, from the perspective of principal and
agent, it is efficient to keep the agent within the firm.2 In the absence of a non-compete
clause, the principal cannot enforce this outcome, though. The employee’s inalienable
right to leave the firm is captured by giving all the bargaining power to the agent once
the project has proven successful. Without enforceable non-compete clauses, all that
the principal can do to preempt ex-post conflict is to pay a wage upfront. While doing
so does not change the opportunity structure, the agent might be less inclined to exploit
a principal who has been generous in the first place.
The uneven distribution of bargaining power is maintained in the treatments with non-
compete clauses. The agent may still make a take-it-or-leave-it offer if the project was
a success. However, while the principal may only be sure to get the competitive profit
in the Baseline, in the Treatment she is guaranteed the monopoly profit. In line with
real-world legal provisions, we assume that the agent is compensated for the reduction
in outside options brought about by the NCC. We distinguish between two alternative
treatments that differ in the size of the compensation payment. Compensation payments
are defined such that in the High treatment, a profit maximizing principal who expects
the agent to have the same preferences is indifferent between the presence and the absence
of the clause (see section 4 below). By contrast, in the Low treatment, according to the
same assumptions, the principal strictly prefers an institutional environment with the
clause. The opposite holds for the agent since the smaller compensation reduces her
bargaining power. In the High treatment, k = (1 − α)Π, while k is strictly smaller in
treatment Low.
1As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, our model does not reflect the riskiness of spin-off en-
trepreneurship, which could have been captured by letting A’s α-share vary randomly. This has
been avoided to limit the complexity of the experimental design.
2 If the demand side is taken into consideration, this may of course be associated with a loss in social
welfare.
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4. Hypotheses
In developing hypotheses about the outcomes of the principal-agent interaction, we first
assume rational participants who hold standard, opportunistic and risk neutral pref-
erences, as well as common knowledge of these preferences. We look for the unique
sequentially rational equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982). If the innovation is success-
ful, P accepts if v ≤ (1− α)Π. Consequently A demands v = (1− α)Π and expects to
earn
E[VA] =
√
e
ρ
(1− α)Π + w − e (1)
which she maximizes by investing (for relevant parameterization) optimal effort3
e∗ =
(1− α)2Π2
4ρ2
. (2)
As the initial wage is merely a gift, the principal sets optimal wage w∗ = 0.
The game has multiple other equilibria. For instance, the bargaining stage after a
successful innovation has a continuum of equilibria, each characterized by A demanding
some v+, with αΠ < v+ < (1 − α)Π, and P accepting any v ≤ v+. There also exist
equilibria with positive w.4 Yet none of these equilibria are sequentially rational.
If there is a non-compete clause, the size of k affects P ’s willingness to accept v. She
accepts any v ≤ k, and rejects otherwise. This means that (1 − α)Π in (1) is replaced
by k and, thus, optimal effort changes to
e∗ =
k2
4ρ2
. (3)
3In the experiment, parametrization will guarantee 0 < e∗ < E.
4 Suppose, for example, that A exerts optimal effort e∗, demands some v > (1− α)Π if w < w+, and
v = (1 − α)Π if w ≥ w+. Then P pays w+, accepts if v ≤ (1 − α)Π, and rejects otherwise. This
strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium as unilateral deviation leaves both with at most as much
as before.
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While higher k increases effort, it also reduces the profit of the principal in case of
success. It is easy to show that the principal would see his expected return maximized
for
k∗P =
Π− pi
2
. (4)
The agent on the other hand always prefers a larger k whereas efficiency is maximized
for k = Π− pi.
The level of k is therefore critical for predictions. However, there are some natural
limits that define our parametrization. Whenever k exceeds what the agent could at
most demand in the absence of a NCC, then the principal would never invoke the NCC
and rather pay the employee to stay in the firm. Thus a legal requirement of a very
large k is equivalent to the absence of a NCC. On the other hand, a very small k is likely
to be unconstitutional in societies that grant fundamental human rights to workers, and
levels of mandated compensation are indeed substantial in most industrialized countries.
Reflecting these considerations, in the experiment we will compare two very different
levels of compensation k. In the treatment with a High compensation, the principal
is indifferent between relying on the non-compete clause and A leaving the firm, i.e.
k = (1− α)Π. Furthermore, A invests the same effort as in the Baseline without NCC.
In the treatment with a Low statuary compensation on the other hand, the agent expects
to earn about a third of what he could earn in the Baseline.
This setup leads to the following benchmark solutions:
Hypothesis 1 If all agents are rational, have opportunistic preferences and this is com-
mon knowledge, we expect
a) zero wages
b) less effort (and success) in treatment Low
c) successful renegotiation, irrespective of treatment
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d) lower renegotiation demands v in treatment Low 5
e) lower total profit in Low 5
f) identical effort and outcomes in the Baseline and treatment High.
In view of the abundant evidence (e.g., on ultimatum experiments, see Gu¨th and
Kocher (2014), for a recent review), this benchmark prediction based on common(ly
known) opportunism will likely be rejected. In addition, no differences in outcomes
between the Baseline design and treatment High are predicted under these behavioral
assumptions, which runs counter to abundant experimental evidence indicating the im-
portance of other-regarding preferences. 6 We expect other-regarding concerns to differ
between principal and agent. Whereas the former is more fairness concerned, the latter
is more driven by reciprocity concerns.
A small chance of the principal holding non-opportunistic preferences suffices to in-
troduce strategic uncertainty. In this case, the agent has to expect a reduction in payoff.
In response, she will reduce effort, compared to the benchmark assuming preferences to
be common knowledge.7 By contrast, in the High treatment the agent expects the same
payoff as the one predicted in the Baseline, this time, however, with certainty due to
an exogenous rule. Thus, incentives to invest effort are lower in the Baseline than in
treatment High.
Hypothesis 2 When principals hold social preferences, in comparison to the bench-
mark solutions,
a) agents make lower demands in the renegotiation in the Baseline
b) agents invest less effort in the Baseline
5 Compared to the other settings.
6 See experimental results on ultimatum bargaining as, for example, summarized in Camerer (2003).
7 Note that if a selfish principal could ex ante restrict the agent’s bargaining power, he would like to
do so, as the increase in payoff in case of success outweighs the loss in effort.
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c) principals reject high demands in the renegotiation stage
and, furthermore,
Hypothesis 3 Agents invest less effort in the Baseline than in treatment High.
In equilibrium, wage w is zero. However, in the spirit of an efficiency wage (Akerlof,
1984), principals might want to pay a positive wage. Two reasons hold irrespective of
treatment. First, with any positive investment e, the agent makes a loss if the innovation
fails. Loss aversion (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) could therefore deter agents from
investing optimal effort. A positive wage (partly) insures the agent against the risk of
loss. Second, principals could also hope that agents reciprocate a high wage by higher
effort, as for example in gift exchange experiments (for an overview see Brandts and
Charness 2004).
The gift exchange motive is independent of variations in treatment or k. The problem
of loss aversion, however, is stronger in the Baseline and treatment High where optimal
effort, and therefore possible losses, are higher than in Low. This suggests
Hypothesis 4 Due to reciprocity and (expected) loss aversion (of the agent),
a) principals pay positive wages
b) principals pay lower wages in the Low treatment
c) effort increases in the wage.
In treatment Low a third effect is possible. A fair minded principal may want to signal
her willingness to concede more to the agent in case of a successful innovation in order to
induce higher effort. Thus, by paying a high wage, she induces effort both via creating
positive reciprocity and via creating an expectation that effort will pay off. While it
is unclear whether this outweighs the previous negative effect from Hypothesis 4b, we
alternatively expect
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Hypothesis 5 Fair minded principals signal their intention to leave more to the agent
in case of a successful innovation by paying a high w. Contradicting Hypothesis 4b this
may lead to higher wages w in treatment Low than according to the benchmark.
Finally, it is possible that agents also show positive reciprocity in the renegotiation stage.
Hypothesis 6 Agents behave reciprocally in the renegotiation stage and demand less
the higher the wage.
5. Design
The principal-agent interaction outlined in Section 3 (cf. Figure 1 above) was turned into
an experimental game by choosing a suitable parameterization. Specifically, we set Π =
18000, pi = 4000, E = 6000, ρ = 100, α = 1/3, klow = 7000, khigh = 12000, which results
in the point predictions listed in Table 1. Parameters are chosen such that the principal’s
payoff in case the project fails is constant across treatments. With High compensation,
principal and agent receive the same payoffs as in the Baseline in case the innovation
occurs. Consequently, the profit maximizing degree of effort is also the same in both
treatments. By contrast, with Low compensation, the principal is substantially better
off if the project succeeds, compared with the remaining treatments. This translates into
substantially lower effort of an agent who maximizes her expected payoff. The interaction
is neutrally framed as participant ”B” deciding about ”investing”, with effects also for
the ”payoff” of participant ”B”. The experiment was conducted in the lab of the Max
Planck Institute of Economics in Jena, Germany.
To investigate whether effects are stable over time, participants played the stage game
eight announced times with varying partners. Roles were kept constant throughout
and a stranger protocol was adopted; i.e., subjects were randomly rematched in each
round. To ensure that observations are independent without inducing participants to
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Table 1: Point Predictions Assuming Standard Preferences
Baseline Low High
w 0 0 0
e∗ 3,600 1,225 3,600
p 0.60 0.35 0.60
v 12,000 ≥7,000 ≥12,000
VA success 8,400 5,775 8,400
VA failure -3,600 -1,225 -3,600
E[VA] 3,600 1,225 3,600
VP success 6,000 11,000 6,000
VP failure 4,000 4,000 4,000
E[VP ] 5,200 6,450 5,200
E[VA] + E[VP ] 8,800 7,675 8,800
second guess group composition (see, for example Charness, 2000; Montero et al., 2008),
participants were assigned to matching groups of 16 (8 P and 8 A) but did not know that
matching groups were of limited size. We collected data from eight matching groups for
either treatment. In the treatments with non-compete clause, compensation k alternated
between being Low or High from period to period to discourage participants from simply
repeating prior choices without reassessing them in light of feedback information. First-
round compensation was counterbalanced between matching groups.
In the interest of investigating the effects of a regime change, an unannounced restart
followed after the end of period 8.8 Participants who played the Baseline in the first
phase were now assigned to an environment with an enforceable non-compete clause
and changing size of compensation (alternating from period to period). Participants
who were in a context with a non-compete clause now played the Baseline. This design
was chosen to avoid confounding the institutional comparisons with the selection bias
of between-subject comparisons and to control for order effects of institutional changes.
8 Participants knew from the beginning that the experiment has several parts, but they did not know
the design of future parts.
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The second phase of the experiment also lasted eight announced periods. Roles and,
unbeknownst to participants, matching groups were kept constant throughout.
The experiment was implemented in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants were
invited with the software ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and had to take a quiz to make sure
they had understood the instructions. In eight sessions, we had a total of 256 student
participants of various majors, 46.39% female, mean age 23.58. We had eight indepen-
dent observations in the Baseline and in either treatment. Earnings from the experiment
were translated into real money at an exchange rate of 1000 Taler = e1.40. We paid
out one randomly chosen period from the first and the second part of the experiment.
Participants on average earned e20.39 (26.44 USD), e22.46 for principals and e18.38
for agents. The experiment lasted on average around two and a half hours, including
admission and payment.
6. Results
We first report treatment effects from the initial eight periods, before we take a closer
look at the effects of changing legal regimes. From a policy perspective, comparing
outcomes for participants who have not had experiences with the opposite regime is
analogous to comparing jurisdictions that honor non-compete clauses with others where
they are illegal.
6.1. Effort and Wages
Our study is motivated by the concern that non-compete clauses might stifle agent
effort and thereby reduce innovation. The second to left barplot in Figure 2 shows
a first, unexpected finding. Against theoretical expectations (Hypotheses 1b and 3),
imposing a non-compete clause has no significant effect on effort. Effort in the Baseline
does not differ significantly from that in either treatment, neither non-parametrically nor
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parametrically.9 There is, however, some indication that effort in High is (marginally)
significantly higher than in Low (one-sided signed rank test: p = 0.0618, mixed effects
panel estimation: p = 0.0716).
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Figure 2: Main Effects, Inexperienced Participants
Note: Data from periods 1 to 8 only. 90% Confidence intervals based on 10,000 bootstrap resamples.
Result 1 Preventing agents from leaving the firm does not lead to significant increases
or reductions of effort even if compensation paid to agents is low.
The result becomes even stronger if we compare outcomes with predictions from stan-
dard economic theory. Signrank tests over means of matching groups reject all point
predictions. Effort is lower than predicted in the Baseline (N = 8, p = .0499) (confirm-
ing Hypothesis 4b) and in treatment High (N = 8, p = .0499), and it is higher than
predicted in treatment Low (N = 8, p = .0177). Also, in all three settings, effort is sig-
nificantly below the efficient effort of 4900 tokens (p < .05). If we express effort relative
to the point prediction, they are at 83.06% in the Baseline, 87.37% in treatment High,
9 Unless mentioned otherwise, all non-parametric tests in this paper are based on the distribution of
averages over all periods per matching group. For parametric estimations, we control for the panel
structure by including a random effect per individual nested in a random effect on the group level.
Unless mentioned otherwise all tests are two-sided.
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but at 227.30% in treatment Low. This relative deviation differs significantly between
the Baseline and treatment Low (ranksum test, N = 16, p = .0008) and between treat-
ments Low and High (signrank test, N = 8, p = .0117), but not between the Baseline
and treatment High (ranksum test, N = 16, p = .4622). If there is an NCC and com-
pensation is low, participants behave in a way that squarely rejects the effect predicted
by standard economic theory.
One piece of explanation follows from the barplot of average wages in Figure 2. In the
Baseline and in the two treatments, principals pay sizeable wages (signrank tests reject
the null hypothesis that wages are zero for all three settings at N = 8, p = .011710). Yet
wages are higher in the Low treatment than in both the Baseline (Mann Whitney test,
N = 16, p = .0587) and the High treatment (signrank test, N=8, p = .0173).11 We thus
reject Hypothesis 4b and confirm the competing Hypothesis 5: principals use wage to
induce higher effort, especially when effort is particularly risky for the agent.
In line with Hypothesis 4c the wage level exerts a strongly positive effect on effort,
which is also highly significant statistically (Table 2). Note also the significant and
strong interaction between wage and treatment Low. In treatment Low effort on average
increases by 0.46 for every unit increase in w, which is an entire 36% higher than the
0.29 in the Baseline. Thus, agents react stronger to changes in the wage if they are in
a weaker position. However note that, conditional on wages, effort in treatment Low
is significantly lower than in the Baseline. This shows the critical role of the wage.
Through paying a substantial wage, principals counteract the detrimental effect of Low
compensation on effort (see also Hypothesis 5).
Result 2 Principals pay positive wages. The higher the wage, the higher agents’ effort.
10We have to test at the limit of the support, which makes the result less reliable. In addition,
we therefore also report the highest wage for which the one-sample signrank test still rejects at
conventional levels. Using this procedure, we learn that, in the Baseline, the wage is at least higher
than 1600 (N = 8, p = .049). In the Low Treatment, the wage is at least higher than 1900 (N = 8,
p = .0117), and in the High Treatment, the wage is at least higher than 1300 (N = 8, p = .036).
11 There is no significant difference in wages between the Baseline and High (p = .1415).
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Table 2: Effect of Wage on Effort, Inexperienced Participants
effort coef. s.e.
cons 2137.46*** (248.61)
Low -694.42** (308.61)
High 185.51 (294.29)
wage 0.29*** (0.039)
Low×wage 0.17** (0.068)
High×wage 0.02 (0.065)
N 1024
p model <0.001
Note: Mixed effects linear ML estimation with random effect per subject nested in matching group
effect. Data from periods 1 to 8 only. Regressions include control dummies for periods 2 to 8 (not
reported). *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Wages are more effective in inducing effort if statutory compensation for success is Low.
We thus reject the first two statements of Hypothesis 1 (zero wages throughout, less ef-
fort in treatment Low), based on the assumption of agents holding standard preferences.
If we look at our more behavioral expectations, we find support for the first statement
of Hypothesis 4 (positive wages throughout) but reject the second (lower wages in Low).
This latter rejection means we find support for the opposing Hypothesis 5: it appears
that principals try to counter the low incentives to exert effort in treatment Low by
paying higher wages. We argued that this works, as it signals the principal’s intention
to concede higher retention offers to the agent in case of success. Before we can make
a concluding statement with respect to Hypothesis 5, however, we need to analyse the
final bargaining stage.
6.2. Payoffs
We now turn to payoffs and their distribution. Figure 2 shows that payoffs are highest
in treatment Low, followed by High and the Baseline. These differences are marginally
20
significant at the 10% level. Table 3 summarizes the p-values from non-parametric
tests.12
If we look at individual payoffs, the ranking becomes rather different. Principals earn
considerably and significantly more in Low than in either High or the Baseline, where
in turn they earn about the same. Agents on the other hand earn significantly more in
High than in either Low or the Baseline, where in turn they earn about the same. As
efforts did not differ significantly between the treatments and the Baseline, the reason
for the poorer performance of the latter must result from more frequent conflict in the
bargaining stage, which will be analyzed in more detail later.
Result 3 Payoffs are higher in the treatments with NCC. Principals earn most when
compensation is Low, agents when it is High.
Table 3: Test Results for Comparisons of Payoffs
Base vs. Low Base vs. High Low vs. High
Total Payoffs 0.0754 0.0742 0.0929
Agent 0.9164 0.0460 0.0173
Principal 0.0157 0.7527 0.0117
Note: Reported values are p-values from two-sided rank-sum tests (com-
parisons to Baseline) and signed-rank tests (Low vs. High).
Figure 2 shows profits conditioned on success, treatment and role. Due to the high
wages, agents make only small losses in the Baseline and in treatment High in case
the innovation fails. For a Low compensation, wages are high enough to outweigh the
losses on average. If the project fails, agents earn significantly more than predicted, and
principals earn considerably less (sign-rank tests compared to prediction, all p ≤ 0.0117).
This is yet another piece of evidence that through the wage, principals insure agents
against the risk of project failure.
12 Note that these results are in line with our results on effort which in combination with chance moves
(success of innovation) determines efficiency.
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If the innovation project is successful, in the Baseline agents earn significantly less than
standard economic theory predicts, and principals earn significantly more. Effectively,
the difference in earnings predicted by theory vanishes. If non-compete clauses are
honored, agent earnings are not significantly different from theoretical predictions. Yet
principals earn significantly less than predicted, irrespective of treatment (sign-rank tests
compared to prediction, all p ≤ 0.0687).
6.3. Retention Bargaining and Spin-off Entrepreneurship
Our experiment is deliberately designed such that renegotiations between purely self-
interested players should always be successful. Contrary to predictions, we observe a
substantial share of renegotiations that fail. Acceptance rates in the different treatments
reflect that the consequences of rejecting differ between the treatments. Without the
non-compete clause, failed renegotiation results in the agent starting her own firm and
in reduced joint profits of both parties. In spite of this efficiency loss (from the per-
spective of the two players), 10.64% of the renegotiation demands are rejected in the
Baseline. With 68.18% and 53.04% in the treatment with Low and High compensation,
respectively, rejection rates are significantly higher (Mann Whitney, N = 16, p = .0008)
when a non-compete clause limits the consequences of failed renegotiation.
Result 4 A non-negligible fraction of renegotiations fail. Renegotiation demands are
more likely to be rejected in the treatments with NCC.
How does behavior unfold in the experiment, and what factors influence agents’ rene-
gotiation demands as well as principals’ acceptance or rejection? The negotiation pro-
tocol gives agents ultimatum power, with outside options differing considerably between
treatments. Only in the Baseline, agreement results in higher profits for the players
and the outside option is rather fair. In treatment Low the outside option favors the
principal, and vice versa in High. Figure 3 shows that in the Baseline agents make fairly
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cautious demands. Almost all of them are below the theoretical prediction of 12,000
tokens. By contrast, if there is a non-compete clause, the majority of agents demand
more than the guaranteed compensation. Comparisons show that agents demand most
in treatment High, and least in treatment Low.13
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With respect to fairness concerns we need to look at how these demands compare to
a benchmark. The most straightforward benchmark depends on the wage and invested
effort. Figure 4 shows the distributions of the shares of the entire surplus agents demand
overall, i.e. taking into account the wage they already received and the invested effort.
Remember that effort is private information and agents could use that to their advantage.
However, strikingly in the Baseline and in treatment Low where the outside option is
either relatively fair or the agent receives less in conflict, demanded shares are centered
on the equal split and do not differ significantly from it according to signrank tests. In
treatment High, however, where the agent is ahead if the principal rejects, demanded
shares are considerably above 0.5 (signrank test, p=0.0089) and significantly higher
than in the other cases. We must also compare demanded shares with the benchmark
13 All treatment comparisons are significant: Baseline vs. Low, Mann Whitney, N = 16, p = .0567;
Baseline vs. High, N = 16, p = .0016; Low vs. High, signrank test, N = 8, p = .0117.
23
cases. In the Baseline, shares are significantly smaller than the benchmark (signrank
test p=0.0179) and in the treatments they are significantly larger (signrank test Low
p=0.0059; High p=0.0087).
Result 5 Compared to equilibrium shares, agents demand less in the Baseline but more
in the treatments with non-compete clause.
But how do final demands depend on the history of play? The regressions in Table
4 show that demands of agents in case of success decrease in the wage they received.
As model (2) shows, this effect is the same in all treatments including treatment Low
(see also the joint hypothesis tests in the footnote of the table). Agents are not more
sensitive to the size of the wage if the compensation scheme favors the principal. In
all treatments, however, demands decrease in wage by significantly less than one (Wald
tests, p < .001).
Table 4: Explaining Renegotiation Demands, Inexperienced Subjects
demand (1) (2)
Low -781.641** -593.572
High 2152.843*** 2101.854***
wage -0.246*** -0.238**
Low×wage -0.073
High×wage 0.027
cons 8021.256*** 7987.925***
all models: N = 498; p < 0.001
Note: Mixed effects linear ML estimation with random effect per subject nested in matching group
effect. Data from periods 1 to 8 only. Regressions include control dummies for periods 2 to 8 (not
reported). *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Wald tests: Model (2): wage+Low×wage=0
p = 0.020∗∗; wage+High×wage=0 p = 0.067∗.
Result 6 Demands decline equally strongly in the received wage in all three settings.
In Table 5 we analyze the acceptance rates of renegotiation demands. Model (1)
confirms our non-parametric result that overall acceptance is significantly less likely
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Table 5: Explaining Acceptance, Inexperienced Subjects
acceptance (1) (2)
Low -3.133*** 0.670
High -2.444*** -0.847
demand -0.002***
Low×demand -0.001*
High×demand -18e-6
cons 2.312*** 17.792***
logN 498
p model <0.001
Note: Mixed effects logit estimation with random effects on subjects
nested in group effects. Model 2 includes dummies for periods 2 to 8
(not reported). Significance: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
in the treatments with NCC.14 As model (2) shows, the differences in the base rate
of acceptance are due to differences in demands.15 Acceptance decreases significantly
in demands in all settings, but in treatment Low it decreases stronger than in the
Baseline.16 This contradicts our expectation from Hypothesis 5 that principals are more
willing to concede a higher payoff for the agent in treatment Low.
Result 7 While principals pay higher wages in treatment Low (supporting hypothesis
5), they are not willing to concede more to the agent (contradicting it).
6.4. Regime Change
In regulatory practice, if the regulator is convinced that another regime is preferable over
the current, introducing the purportedly better rule requires regime change. Individuals
who have gained experience with the previous regime are exposed to new rules. We
have shown above that, for inexperienced subjects, honoring non-compete clauses does
14 Furthermore, it is significantly smaller in Low (Wald test: Low+High=0, p < 0.0001).
15 In model (2) the base rate of acceptance is equal in the two treatments (Wald test: Low+High=0
p = 0.9848).
16 Joint hypothesis test (Wald-test) model (2): demand+Low:demand=0 p < 0.001;
demand+High:demand=0 p < 0.001; Low:demand + High:demand=0 p = 0.195.
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not have significant effects on effort. Principals and agents unequivocally benefit. It
depends on the size of the statutory compensation whether principals or agents make
more profit.
So, do choices and outcomes change when changing the regime? As Figure 5 shows,
treatment effects on effort are pronounced. Descriptively, introducing non-compete
clauses has a clear positive effect on effort if compensation is High. This impression
is already supported non-parametrically (signrank test, N = 8, p = .0251). Interest-
ingly, parametrically we also find that effort significantly increases, in comparison to a
regime with Low compensation, if non-compete clauses are no longer enforced (linear
mixed effects, N = 1024, coef 354.440, p = .033).
Result 8 Introducing the enforcement of non-compete clauses increases effort if the
compensation paid to agents is high. Abolishing the enforcement increases effort signif-
icantly if compensation was low.
Introducing non-compete clauses is less beneficial for the joint profit of both parties than
one might have expected, given the clear positive effect on effort. Non-parametrically,
we do not find a significant effect. Even parametrically, we only find a positive effect if
compensation is High, and it is only weakly significant (linear mixed effects, N=1024,
coef. 824.635, p = .070). By contrast, abolishing a non-compete regime clearly reduces
joint profit, irrespective of the size of the compensation (linear mixed effects, N = 1024,
Low 1381.783, p = .002; High 1021.025, p = 0.022).
Result 9 Abolishing the enforcement of non-compete clauses reduces the joint profit of
principals and agents, irrespective of the size of compensation.
This result is due to the substantial number of disagreements in the Baseline.
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Figure 5: Effort, over time
7. Conclusion
A growing literature notwithstanding, the effects of non-compete clauses in labor con-
tracts are still imperfectly understood. To provide additional evidence, in this paper we
reported first experimental results from introducing non-compete clauses to a stylized
principal-agent model with probabilistic returns to non-contractible effort. Our study
was motivated by the question how non-compete clauses affect employee effort. As a
non-compete clause prevents employees from starting a spin-off firm based on successful
innovation, adverse effects on employee effort are to be expected. However, our exper-
imental results do not suggest that such adverse effects are a substantial concern. We
compared two treatments, one where statuary compensation for implementing a non-
compete clause is High and one where it is Low, to a Baseline scenario without such a
clause. Parameters were chosen such that, with commonly known opportunistic prefer-
ences, in the High treatment the principal would be indifferent between having or not
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having the right to exercise the clause. In the Low treatment, ex post the non-compete
clause is very attractive for the principal. Contrary to theoretical predictions, effort did
not differ significantly in all three settings, not even in the Low treatment, for which
standard economic theory predicts a dramatic reduction of effort. In the experiment, in-
experienced principals prevented this outcome by voluntarily paying a substantial wage
to insure their agent against the risk of project failure, and to induce higher effort. Agents
in turn reciprocated higher wages with more effort. In other words, employer and em-
ployee managed to overcome the lack of incentives inherent to the Low compensation by
means of reciprocity in the spirit of gift exchange (see Fehr et al. 1993 for experimental
evidence). Newly introducing non-compete clauses did not reduce employee effort, even
if statutory compensation is low.
Our findings accordingly indicate that unless the statuary compensation is extremely
low, non-compete clauses are unlikely to have a substantially adverse effect on employee
effort. Even in the stylized experimental setting, both sides of the labor market found
alternative ways to create incentives. This result is likely to be even stronger in the real
world where, unlike our simplified interaction, other contractual agreements can be used
to enhance agent effort.
Although competition reduces the joint profit of (former) employer and employee, in
the experiment spin-off entrepreneurship results from failed renegotiation after successful
innovations. Many agents do not attempt to extract as much of the innovation surplus
as standard economic theory would suggest. Nonetheless a substantial share of their
demands is rejected, with high demands being more likely to fail. This breakdown of
cooperation in the stylized setting of the experiment resonates with empirical evidence
suggesting that spin-offs are often induced by strategic disagreements between employers
and employees, including disagreement about compensation schemes (Klepper, 2010;
Thompson and Chen, 2011).
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It is in the nature of lab experiments to abstract from many elements characterizing
real-life interaction between employers and employees. The multi-dimensional nature
of employee behavior encompassing, e.g., decisions about investing in employer-specific
human capital as well reactions to variations in compensation schemes, is reduced to a
one-dimensional effort choice to keep the experimental setup sufficiently simple for the
participants. In order not to confound the effect of the non-compete clause itself with
effects resulting from the endogenous choice to include the clause in the employment
contract or to invoke it if the employee plans to leave the company, in the experiment
we impose the clause exogenously. As a consequence, our design brackets the question
whether waiving the clause despite its legality creates trust. Our design also excludes
direct investments by employers: in the experiment only agents invest into the success
of the project. The only option for the principal is to pay a high wage to induce effort.
If agents are sensitive to reciprocity, a substantial investment by the principal in the
relationship might give agents an additional reason to exert higher effort. Yet note that,
as our experiment shows, reciprocity in investment is not a condition for agents to be-
come active. In addition, interaction in the experiment is anonymous and ad hoc, and
participants are rematched every period, which renders our setup a worst-case scenario
for the formation of mutual trust and reputation, e.g. of being intrinsically motivated.
Employees are merely assigned to their employer. There is no labor market and hence
no potentially adverse effect of non-compete clauses on labor mobility and embodied
knowledge transfer (Gilson, 1999). Effort is not laborious, but simply a costly invest-
ment. If the project is successful, this simply means that total profit is higher. There
is no creation of knowledge, and no personal attachment of workers to the knowledge
they have created. Nor are fundamentally new products developed, which might lead to
disagreements about product strategy, and possibly to welfare losses if the new product
cannot be marketed through an entrepreneurial spin-off but is shelved (Klepper and
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Thompson, 2010).
In future work, at least some of these aspects might be explored via additional treat-
ments. Yet we believe that our experiment still captures the most essential aspects of
non-compete clauses in the context of spin-off entrepreneurship. While we did not find
adverse effects of non-compete clauses on employee effort, their enforcement substantially
reduced the intensity of competition even in the stylized experiment. Such a reduction
in competition may be all the more problematic in the real world where competition
tends to increase product variety and to spurn innovation efforts. Our experimental
study may thus help policy makers in their quest to design institutions conducive to
high-tech entrepreneurship, which in turns holds the promise of innovation, job creation
and growth as epitomized by the example of Silicon Valley.
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A. Translation of Instructions
The following is a translation of the German instructions for the sessions in which
participants first faced the baseline. Whenever the instructions in the other sessions
differed, we indicate this by putting the differing text in parentheses and preceding it
by “N-B:”.
Instructions
Welcome! Please stop any communication with other participants and switch off your
mobile phone. In the following experiment you can earn money, which is why you should
read these instructions very carefully. If anything is unclear, please raise your hand and
wait for a supervisor to come to your cubicle. The instructions are identical for all
participants. You will remain anonymous throughout this experiment. This means that
no participant will be informed about your identity.
There are two different roles. Half of the participants decide in role A, the other half in
role B. Roles are randomly assigned at the beginning and you keep your role throughout
the entire experiment. In total, the experiment consists of two sections. Each section in
turn consists of eight rounds. For each section, you will receive new instructions. How
you behave in a round or section has no effect whatsoever on the proceedings in any of
the following rounds or sections.
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During the experiment, all sums of money will be denominated in Taler. You can
earn money in every round - but it is also possible to lose money. How much money
you earn depends on your decisions, on the decisions made by the participant assigned
to you, and on random draws. However, in each section only the money earned in one
single round is paid to you: At the end of the experiment a random draw determines
which round per section is relevant for the calculation of the payoffs of all participants
(there is one independent draw per section). For every participant, the total payoff is
then the sum of amounts reached in these two rounds. The payoff you earn in Taler is
converted into eat the end of the experiment and paid to you in cash at the exchange
rate of 1000 Taler = e1.40.
For showing up on time you receive an additional payment of e2.50. At the beginning
of each section you will furthermore be asked to answer a control questionnaire. For
answering these correctly you receive an additional e2.00 each.
Should you incur losses during the experiment, these will be subtracted from your
other payments. If your losses can not be balance against your fixed payments, you have
two options: Either you work the remaining difference off (counting the frequency of a
letter in a text), or you pay it out of your own expenses.
Part 1
In each of the following eight rounds, you will interact with another participant in the
other role who will be randomly assigned to you. In this section you will interact with
no one more than once.
In each round, participants A and B successively make the following decisions.
1. A determines a fixed payment f for B, which can lie anywhere between 0 and
10,000. B receives this fixed payment for sure, regardless of how the round pro-
gresses.
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2. B is informed about the size of payment f and determines how much to invest in
a project which can earn a high profit. This investment e, which can lie anywhere
between 1 and 6,000, costs B exactly the amount e and is subtracted from B’s
payoff.
3. Investment e determines the probability of the project being successful. With
probability w =
√
e/100 it will be successful; with residual probability 1 − w =
1 − √e/100 it will not be successful: The more B invests, the more likely will
the project be successful (see Figure 1). Only B knows how much he invested.
Participant A is never informed about it.
A random draw therefore determines with probability w, whether the project is suc-
cessful.
• If the project is not successful, the round ends and
A receives: 4,000− f
B receives: f − e
• If the project is successful, B has the opportunity to demand a further payment v
from A.
a) B determines his demand v (any amount between 0 and 18,000).
b) A is told how much B is demanding and decides whether to accept or reject.
The round ends with the following payments:
∗ If participant A accepts participant B’s demand v, the round ends and
A receives: 18,000− f − v B receives: f + v − e
∗ If participant A rejects participant B’s demand v, the total payoff from
the successful project is reduced, and the round ends and
A receives: 6,000− f B receives: 6,000 + f − e
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( N-B: If participant A rejects participant B’s demand v, the round ends
and
A receives: 18,000−K − f
B receives: K + f − e)
(N-B: The sum K is determined at the beginning of a round, and both participants (A
and B) are informed about it. This sum can be either 7,000 or 12,000 Taler.)
The diagram in Figure 2 illustrates how a round proceeds.
You will now receive a questionnaire with control questions which shall ensure that all
participants have understood the instructions. Should you have any questions you may
contact a supervisor at any time. You will receive e2.00 for answering the questionnaire.
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Part 2
In each of the following eight rounds, you will interact with another participant in the
other role, who will be randomly assigned to you. In this section you will interact with
no one more than once.
In each round, both participants make the same decisions as in the first part. The
only difference is that the payoffs in case of success and in case of A rejecting demand
v change:
Thus, as before, if the project is successful, B can demand a further payment v from
A:
a) B determines his demand v (any sum between 0 and 18,000).
b) A is told how much B is demanding and decides whether to accept or reject. The
round ends with the following payments:
– If participant A accepts participant B’s demand v, the round ends and
A receives: 18,000− f − v
B receives: f + v − e
– If participant A rejects participant B’s demand v, then
A receives: 18,000−K − f
B receives: K + f − e
( N-B: If participant A rejects participant B’s demand v, the total payoff from
the successful project is reduced, and the round ends and
A receives: 6.000-f
B receives: 6.000+f-e.)
The sum K is determined at the beginning of a round, and both participants (A and
B) are informed about it. This sum can be either 7,000 or 12,000 Taler. (N-B: paragraph
deleted.)
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Figure 2: Timeline of a round
3.
A move of chance decides, 
whether the project is successful
it is successful with 
probability 
100/e
it is not successful with 
residual probability
100/1 e
The round ends:
A obtains  4000-f
B obtains  f-e
A rejectsA accepts
a) B determines v: the amount he 
wants to receive on top of  f 
b) A learns about v and accepts 
or rejects
The round ends:
A obtains 18000-f-v
B obtains f+v-e
1.
A determines fixed payment f 
(between 0 and 10000).
2.
B is informed about f and determines investment e 
(between 1 and 6000). 
A is not informed about e. 
The round ends:
A obtains 6000-f
B obtains 6000+f-e
(N-B: see Figure 3 below.)
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The diagram in Figure 2 illustrates how a round proceeds.
You will now receive a questionnaire with control questions which shall ensure that all
participants have understood the instructions. Should you have any questions you may
contact a supervisor at any time. You will receive e2.00 for answering the questionnaire.
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Figure 3: Timeline of a round
3.
A move of chance decides, 
whether the project is successful
it is successful with 
probability 
100/e
it is not successful with 
residual probability
100/1 e
The round ends:
A obtains  4000-f
B obtains  f-e
A rejectsA accepts
a) B determines v: the amount he 
wants to receive on top of  f 
b) A learns about v and accepts 
or rejects
The round ends:
A obtains 18000-f-v
B obtains f+v-e
1.
A determines fixed payment f 
(between 0 and 10000).
2.
B is informed about f and determines investment e 
(between 1 and 6000). 
A is not informed about e. 
The round ends:
A obtains 18000-f-K
B obtains f+K-e
(N-B: see Figure 2.)
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